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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF FRENCH LABOR LAW
By STEFAN A. RIESENFELD*
T i present turmoil in Europe will probably raise serious
doubts in almost everybody's mind as to whether it is worth
while to give any attention to questions of law and administration
of justice on the continent. It might seem that almost all gov-
ernmental machinery there has either fallen into disorder or has
been directed in a course which appears abnormal and pathological.
Yet generalizations of this kind are seldom correct, and the present
writer believes that the recent developments of labor legislation
in France are worthy of being known to American readers in-
terested in labor problems. This is true particularly because it
can hardly be disputed that the question of the legal' treatment
of labor relations is one of the most vital and essential modern
governmental problems.
*Instructor in law, University of Minnesota.
'The word "legal" should not be overlooked. The question of how much
and in what direction the law should interfere in labor relations, and how
much should be left to the free play of economic forces and the good will of
the parties to abide by understandings reached, is at the very root of the
whole idea of modem industrial democracy. It might be remembered that
Dean Lloyd Garrison has recently advanced the following view with respect
to this point: "The establishment and maintenance of satisfactory relations
betveen labor and management (given the essential prerequisites of trained,
seasoned and intelligent labor leaders, patient and dispassionate managers
and a relative equilibrium of the bargaining power) depend upon the fol-
lowing factors: (1) the frank recognition of the right of employees to
organize and to select representatives of their own choosing to deal with
management, whether these representatives be employees, non-employees
or labor unions as entities; (2) the frank acceptance of collective bargain-
ing, which means the honest effort to regularize by agreement wages, hours
and working conditions; (3) the reduction of these agreements to writing;
(4) the creation of machinery for facilitating the negotiation from time to
time of desired changes in the terms of these agreements and (5) the
creation of additional and separate machinery for quasi-judicial interpreta-
tion and enforcement of these agreements. Garrison, The National Railroad
Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, (1937) 46 Yale L. J.
567, 592.
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The phase of French labor legislation which will be treated in
greater detail on the following pages is the period beginning with
the first cabinet of Leon Blum, who formed his government on the
night of June 4th, 1936.2 Then a new distinct chapter of French
Labor Law was initiated, based on the industrial program of the
Popular Front. Premier Blum, in his first official radio address
on June 5th, told his listeners of three bills which were among
those to be submitted to the two Houses and designed to put into
effect the principal reforms demanded by labor, namely the bill
concerning the forty hour week, the bill concerning collective bar-
gaining, and the bill concerning paid vacations.3  While the first
and the last measures, passed on June 21st, 19364 and June 20th,
19361 respectively, were of greatest social and economic significance
and have been the object of much discussion in circles concerned
with labor issues, the most interesting feature to the legal profes-
sion is probably the development of the law pertaining to collective
bargaining. It entered into a new stage with the Collective Agree-
ments Act of June 24th, 1936,6 a statute which was soon followed
by other legislation.
Collective bargaining has recently come to be regarded as the
most effective instrument for the preservation of industrial peace,
as the manifestation of a "collaboration of classes" instead of
"class struggle," and as the means by which a friendly adjustment
of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours,
and other working conditions could be reached and maintained.
This is true for the United States7 as well as for France. Thus
2See Le Temps, Saturday, June 6th and Sunday, June 7th front page.
It might be recalled that this government remained in office until June 21st,
1937; it was followed by the first Chautemps Cabinet from June 22nd, 1937,
to January 14th, 1938, and the second Chautemps Cabinet from January 18th,
1938, to March llth, 1938. A second Blum Cabinet lasted from March llth,
1938, to April 8th, 1938; on April 10th, 1938, the present Daladier Cabinet
assumed its powers.3See Le Temps, Saturday, June 6th and Sunday, June 7th, 1936, page 3.4Journal Officiel, June 26th, 1936, p. 6699; (1936) Dalloz, Bulletin
L~gislatif, 410. This statute was greatly restricted in its applicability by
four emergency decrees of the Daladier Cabinet on November 12th, 1938,
among a total of fifty-eight emergency decrees enacted on that date.
They were the cause of the attempt of the Conf~d~ration Ginrale du
Travail to call a general strike on November 30th, 1938 which was crushed
by the government Cf. Pic, Le Nouveau Statut du Travail et le Redresse-
ment National, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Jan. 1939, 24, 28, 35.5Journal Officiel, June 26th, 1936, p. 6698; (1936) Dalloz, Bulletin
L~gislatif, 408.
6Journal Officiel, June 26th, 1936, p. 6698; (1936) Dalloz, Bulletin
Ldgislatif 409.
7Cf. National Labor Relations Act, section 1, Findings and Policy,
(1935) 49 Stat. at L. 449.
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the great significance which the French New Deal of the Blum
cabinet attributed to a reorganization of the law with respect to
collective bargaining is readily understood, particularly when one
remembers that this government was formed in the midst of the
well-known French sit-down strikes that started on May 26th.
To be sure, there already existed a legal recognition and regula-
tion of collective bargaining and the resulting agreements before
the new legislation. But the latter opened up a new chapter.
To grasp its aims and results a survey of its antecedents might be
helpful.
PART I.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE NEW LEGISLATION.8
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL POSITION OF LABOR UNIONS.
No collective bargaining is possible without concerted action
of the workers. Thus the history of collective bargaining is in-
timately connected with the development of industrial organization
and trade unionism. French trade unionism or, as it is called in
France, syndicalism, has, as in the case of trade unionism in most
countries, undergone different stages: first suppression, then mere
toleration, followed by official recognition, and finally of late by
active encouragement and fostering on the side of the government. 9
The era of suppression reaches back, strange as it might seem,
to the period of the French Revolution. By a statute of March
17th, 1791, the Assembl6e Constituante (i.e. the constitutional
convention) abolished the old craft guilds of artisans (called cor-
porations) which had come down from the Middle Ages in
France, as well as in England and Germany. The existence of
these guilds with their sharp monopolistic control of industry'
SAn excellent picture of the old state of the law is given by Fuchs, The
French Law of Collective Labor Agreements, (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 1005.
9out of the literature on the development of French trade unionism we
mention (in the order of date) Seilhac, Syndicats Ouvriers, F~drations,
Bourses du Travail (1902); Renard, Syndicats, Trade-Unions et Corpora-
tions (1909) ; Z6va6s. Le Syndicalisme Contemporain (1911) ; Levine (now
called Lorwin) Syndicalism in France (1914) Studies in History, Economics
and Public Law, ed. by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia Uni-
versity 116; Clark, A History of the French Labor Movement 1910-1928
(1930); see also International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series A,
No. 29, Freedom of Association, vol. 2 (1927), 87 ff. Surveys of the more
recent developments in French trade unionism are given by Villey in the
Revue Politique et Parlementaire under the title "Chronique du Syndicalisme,"
which began to be published in the January issue of 1925, 128 if., and have
appeared from then on down to date, at irregular intervals.
loAs to the history of the French guilds cf. Renard, Syndicats, Trade-
Unions et Corporations (1909) part 1. For the control exercised by the
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was considered to be in irreconcilable contrast to the individualistic
spirit of the French revolution and its magic formula of "liberty"
was thought to embrace also the "freedom of work."
"To begin with next April first every person shall be free to
carry on such business or exercise such profession, art or trade as
he may think best.""
This "freedom of work" was considered to exclude also all
concerted action on the side of the workers, and there was an im-
mediate occasion so to hold. The carpenters had formed a union,
reputed to include 80,000 men in Paris alone, demanding higher
wages. This led to petitions by the employers to the Assembl~e
Constituante to put an end to the "disorders," and the final result
was the famous Le Chapelier Bill of June 14th-17th, 1791, for-
bidding workers' organizations.' 2 The prohibitions were strength-
ened first by a statute of 1803 against coalitions and later under
the First Empire by the Penal Code of 1810, which in sections
291 ff. rigorously restricted the freedom of association, and in
sections 414-416 prohibited concerted action by the workers with
the view of changing their working conditions.' 3
The latter restriction was the first to break down. After a
strike of the Parisian printers, sections 414 ff. of the Penal Code
were amended on May 25th, 186414 so as to recognize by implica-
tion the right of coalition by outlawing its exercise under certain
conditions only, particularly if accompanied by intimidation. The
new section 416 still restricted, however, the freedom of coalition
quite considerably.' 5 The next step in the development was the
English craft guilds see 1 Ashley, English Economic History and Theory(10th ed. 1919); Evans, The Problem of Control in English Medieval
Industry, (1921) 36 Pol. Sci. Qu. 610 ff.; Schechter, The Historical Founda-
tions of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks (1925) 38 ff.
"'Renard, Syndicats, Trade-Unions et Corporations (1909) 146; Pic,
Trait6 -lmentaire de Legislation Industrielle (6th ed. 1930) 67, 68.
Theoretically the freedom of work was established as early as on August
4th, 1789, when the French constitutional convention suppressed all privileges
and monopolies.
'2Cf. Pic, Trait6 Almentaire de Legislation Industrielle (6th ed. 1930)
217; Levine, Syndicalism in France (1914) Studies in History, Economics
and Public Law, ed. by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia Uni-
versity, 20 if.: Ziva~s, Le Syndicalisme Contemporain (1911).
'3Cf. Levine, Syndicalism in France (1914) Studies in History, Eco-
nomics and Public Law, ed. by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia
University 23; Pic, Trait6 P-lmentaire de Legislation Industrielle (6th ed.
1930) 188, 220.
'4(1864) Dalloz, Jurisprudence G6nirale, Recueil P~riodique et Critique
de Jurisprudence, de L6gislation et de Doctrine (henceforth cited Rec. Pr.),
part 4, 53 ff.
'sThe article was attacked by Jules Favre as being practically a negation
of the right of coalition, but it was passed by majority of the legislature. The
reporter on the new bill, M. Olivier, pointed out, that the new crime was
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announcement by the minister of commerce and public works in
May 1868 that, without modifying the law with respect to coali-
tions or unions, the government would henceforth tolerate work-
ingmen's organizations on the same basis on which it had here-
tofore tolerated organizations of employers. 6 This period of
administrative toleration (tolerance administrative) lasted until
1884, when it was replaced by the period of recognition.
The first attempt to obtain statutory recognition of labor unions
was a bill submitted by M. Lockeroy on July 4th, 1876.1. But
by reason of its provisions establishing strict governmental con-
trol, it was opposed by labor itself. On November 22nd, 1880,
a new bill was introduced, which after long debates became law
on March 21st, 1884.18 The statute, expanding the idea of free-
dom of assembly which had formed the object of two previous
general statutes of 1868 and 1881, accomplished the legislative
recognition of the freedom of organization in the field of labor
unions, 0 repealed expressly the Le Chapelier Bill and section 416
of the Penal Code as amended by the statute of 1864, and excluded
the sections 291 ff. of the Penal Code from being applied to trade
unions.20  Freedom to form trade unions without special govern-
mental authorization was expressly granted, provided that they
had as their object exclusively the study and defense of economic,
industrial, commercial and agricultural interests.2 1 The unions must
deposit their by-laws and a list of their officers with the police
authorities.2 2  A union thus formed possessed, under the rule of
the statute of 1884, limited legal personality; it had the right to
sue and to acquire property, but not real property except such as
might be necessary for assembly rooms, libraries and educational
purposes.2  It was expressly provided that each worker had the
right to withdraw at any time, notwithstanding a provision in the
not the coalition as such, but the infringement of the freedom of work by
intimidation in consequence of a planned concerted action. Cf. the interesting
legislative materials on this bill, (reports and debates) printed in (1864)
Dalloz, Rec. Ptr., part 4, 53 ff.
16Levine, Syndicalism in France (1914) Studies in History, Economics
and Public Law, ed. by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia Uni-
versity 38; Ziva~s, Le Syndicalisme Contemporain (1911) 80.
'7Cf. Zevaes, Le Syndicalisme Contemporain (1911) 93 ff.
18(1884) Dalloz, Rec. Per., part 4, 129 (again printing also the highly
interesting legislative reports and extracts from the proceedings).
'In other fields the freedom of association was not fully recognized
until a statute of July 1st, 1901.
=
2 Statute of March 21st, 1884, Art. 1.
-'Statute of March 21st, 1884, Art. 3.22Statute of March 21st, 1884, Art. 4.
28Statute of March 21st, 1884, Art. 6.
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charter to the contrary.24 For a violation of the prohibitions and
impositions of this law a penalty was provided.2 5  A statute of
1901 establishing freedom of association in general by abolishing
section 291 of the Penal Code seems, however, to have altered the
law and to have created impunity for any violation of the fornazl
requirements, the only legal sanction now being failure to acquire
legal personality. 2 A statute of March 12th, 1920, finally abolished
the restrictions on the legal capacity of the trade unions. They may
now acquire by gift or for consideration all kinds of property;
the only thing not permitted to them is to engage in business. 27
The effect of this statute of 1884 was to give the unions a
secured place in the French legal order. On the other hand the
above mentioned section 4 requiring publication of the charters and
the names of the officers caused apprehension of persecutions.
Thus a general congress of Syndicates, as the labor unions were
called, was convoked in Lyons in 1886. There the idea of a Fed-
eration of Syndicates was conceived, and a resolution was passed
founding a National Federation of Syndicates.28 This organiza-
tion, however, had a comparatively short life. A split in the
political socialistic movement affected its existence. Another cen-
tral organization was founded in 1892, for the very purpose of
competing with the National Federation, namely, the Federation
of Labor Bourses. 29  An attempt to bridge the split and to merge
the two organizations was soon made, and a joint congress of
syndicates and labor bourses was called at Nancy in 1894.0 But
there a new division occurred, caused by the issue of the general
24Statute of March 21st, 1884, Art 7.
25Statute of March 21st, 1884, Art. 9.26Cf. Pic, Trait6 Mlimentaire de L~gislation Industrielle (6th ed. 1930)
236, 238.
27(1920) Dalloz, Bulletin Ligislatif 130; cf. Pic, Trait6 Al6mentaire de
Ligislation Industrielle (6th ed. 1930) 276 ff.
2sCf. Seilbac, Syndicats Ouvriers, F~drations, Bourses du Travail
(1902) 262; Z6va~s, Le Syndicalisme Contemporain (1911) 108; Levine,
Syndicalism in France (1914) Studies in History, Economics and Public
Law, ed. by Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University 62.
29Seilhac, Syndicats Ouvriers, F~d~rations, Bourses du Travail (1902)
265, 286, Z6va~s, Le Syndicalisme Contemporain, (1911) 120, 122; Levine,
Syndicalism in France (1914) 64, 76. A labor bourse is strictly speaking
neither a trade union nor a federation of trade unions, but an institution
created by different local unions for the purpose of placement of union men
and the attainment of other labor interests. As to their legal position cf.
Pic, Trait6 R16rnentaire de Legislation Industrielle (6th ed. 1930) 291. The
statutes of 1884 and 1920 do not apply to them.
30More details about this congress, where 1662 French trade unions
were represented, can be found in Seilhac, Syndicats Ouvriers, F~drations,
Bourses du Travail (1902) 265 if, 271 ff; Z6va~s, Le Syndicalisme Con-
temporain (1911) 113 ff.
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strike. The members of the National Federation itself disagreed
violently, and many left the central organization. 3 ' The latter
gradually dissolved. But the dissenters summoned a new congress
at Limoges in 1895, and there a new central organization was
created by 700 syndicates: the Conf6d6ration G6n6rale du Travail
or, abbreviated, C.G.T.3 2  The Federation of Labor Bourses con-
tinued to have a separate existence. This rivalry greatly impaired
the strength of the new group.33 In 1902 unity was finally
reached, and after a change in the structure of the C.G.T. the
Federation of Labor Bourses was merged in the C.G.T.34  The
C.G.T. was from this time on the only significant central organiza-
tion of trade unions until the end of the world war. In 1919 the
so-called Christian Workers, who adhered to the principles of
industrial relations laid down in the Encyclica Rerum Novarum 5
of Pope Leo XIII, formed the Conf6deration Franqaise des Travail-
leurs Chr6tiens. In 1920 the Russian revolution had severe re-
percussions on the socialistic movement. At the Congress of
Orleans, in September, 1920, a minority of communistic syndicates
left the C.G.T. and formed on December 23, 1921, a top organiza-
tion of their own, soon styled the C.G.T.U. (Conf6d6ration Gin-
6rale du Travail Unitaire). 3  The C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U.
remained adversaries until September 1935. Then the unitg
syndicale (united labor unionism) was re-established. 7
The growth of unionism as a whole was, in spite of the laws
of 1884 and 1920, slow and irregular.38 Even if one should trust
B1Seilhac, Syndicats Ouvriers, F6drations, Bourses du Travail (1902)
274; Z6va~s, Le Syndicalisme Contemporain (1911) 120.32Cf. Levine, Syndicalism in France (1914) 91 if; Seilhac, Syndicats
Ouvriers, Fd6rations, Bourses du Travail (1902) 288; Z6vas, Le Syndi-
calisme Contemporain (1911) 126 ff.3 3 0n this point see particularly Seilhac, Syndicats Ouvriers, F~d6ra-
tions, Bourses du Travail (1902) 277.
34Cf. Levine, Syndicalism in France (1914) 162 if; Z6va s, Le Syndical-
isme Contemporain (1911) 128.35As to the Christian Workers unions and their national federation see
particularly Villey, Chronique du Syndicalisme, Revue Politique et Parle-
mentaire, July, 1925, 125; Revue Politique et Parlementaire, July, 1932,
117 if; and Turmann, Le Syndicalisme Chr6tien en France (1930).
36The best description of this schism which the writer could find is the
article "Syndicalisme" by Desgranges in (1923) Larousse Mensuel Illustr6
221; see also Dulot, The Present Position in the French Trade Union
Movement (1923) 7 International Labour Review 695, and the report of the
First Congress of the C. G. T. U., (1922) 6 International Labour Review
563.
37As to this reconciliation see Villey, Chronique du Syndicalisme, Revue
Politique et Parlementaire, September, 1935, 542, December 1935, 528, April
1936, 118.
38It is very difficult to know the exact numbers of the membership in the
French labor unions. Since the World War the French Minister of Labor
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the claims of the national organizations, which are reputed by
some to be exaggerated, 31 the numbers were not very impressive
until recently. As late as in 1926 the C.G.T. possessed only
553,770 members, the C.G.T.U. about 505,000 members, and the
C.F.T.C. around 120,000 members. 40  But in the spring of 1936
the C.G.T. possessed 1,116,265 members and jumped up to
4,314,740 after the Popular Front assumed power.4 1
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE POSITION OF COLLECTIVE
LABOR AGREEMENTS UNTIL 1936.
A. THE ECONOMIC ROLE PLAYED By COLLECTIVE AGREE-
MENTS PRIOR TO THE BLUM CABINET.-The statute of 1884 which
conferred on trade unions a legal standing resulted not only in a
growing unionization of the French workers, but also in giving
these unions an increased possibility of improving the working
conditions through lawful action, i.e. through collective bargain-
ing. Frequently the conclusion of such collective agreements was
the result of the settlement of a strike.
To be sure, collective agreements are not entirely a product of
modern times. There are instances of them in the Middle Ages,
42
has published official statistics three times, but the distribution of the mem-
bers over the different national organizations, i.e. the union affiliation, can-
not be derived therefrom. All this is pointed out in the excellent report of
the member of the State Council, M. Laroque, on the Collective Labor
Agreements in France, a lengthy extract from which is printed in 1935
Bulletin du Minist re du Travail 13 if. The three sets of statistics, which
are based mainly on information furnished by the unions themselves, are
published in 1922 Bulletin du Minist&re du Travail 147 (as of January 1st,
1920) ; 1929 Bulletin du Minist~re du Travail 419 (as of January 1st, 1926);
1932 Bulletin du Ministate du Travail 262 (as of January 1930). According
to these statistics there existed on January 1st, 1914, 4846 labor unions under
the statute of 1884, with a membership of 1,026,302 workers; on January 1st,
1920, 5283 such labor unions, with a membership of 1,580,967; on January
1st, 1926, 6349 such labor unions with a membership of 1,181,297 workers;
and on January 1st, 1930, 6666 such labor unions with a membership of
1,237,223 workers. It is to be observed that not all of these unions belonged
to the national groups; on the other hand the latter ones embraced also the
civil service unions, which were not regular unions. Another statistical
table of the growth of unionism in France from 1884 to 1932 is contained in
52 Annuaire Statistique 1937, R~sum6 R~trospectif, 58. (This table is
evidently based on the surveys by the Ministry of Labor.)
39Cf. Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, (1924)
10 St. Louis L. Rev. 1007. Considering, however, that these numbers in-
clude the civil servant groups, the exaggeration does not seem as considerable
as Prof. Fuchs asserts.4 0See International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series A No.
29, Freedom of Association (1927), Vol. 2, 115.4 1See Maurette, A Year of Experiment in France, (1937) 36 Inter-
national Labour Review, 1 if., 149 f., at 161.4 2Thus the wool-weavers of Speyer (Germany) obtained the conclusion
of collective agreements in 1351 and 1362. 1 Lotmar, Der Arbeitsvertrag
(1902) 758, footnote 1.
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and there existed some instances of tariffs agreed to by the em-
ployers after strikes in France during the 19th century even be-
fore the statute of 1884 ;43 but only after and as a result of this
statute did the bargaining agencies have a permanent and secured
legal character. It gave a new impetus to the development. This
development, however, did not exhibit a rapid and harmonious
tempo, but progressed rather on a slow and irregular path.44 In
two industries, at least, it is true there were comparatively early
collective agreements of great significance, namely, in the coal
mining and the printing industry ;4 also in the textile industry,
particularly in silk fabrication, they played a considerable role. But
in the other industries and especially in commerce, collective agree-
ments before the war were only of extremely limited importance.
They had merely a restricted scope and application, frequently ap-
plying only to the employees of one particular plant and regulating
but specific points, primarily such as had given rise to a strike.4"
It was not until after the war that a considerable increase of col-
lective labor agreements in the different branches of commerce and
industry took place. But even in the post war period, the role
played by the collective agreements was not a leading one.47  The
National Economic Council in a very interesting report of 193448
43Such "tarifs" were agreed upon particularly in the silk industry of
Lyons and the printing industry of Paris. Cf. Moissenet, Ptude sur les Con-
trats Collectifs en Mati~re de Conditions du Travail (1903), 48 ff., 54 ff.
14A good survey of this pre-war development is given by Mr. Laroque's
Rapport sur les Conventions Collectives du Travail Journ. Off. Jan. 3rd,
1935 of which a lengthy extract is printed in 1935 Bulletin du Ministare du
Travail, 13 ff.; for a much more detailed presentation see Raynaud, Le
Contrat Collectif en France (2nd ed. 1921) part I.45Cf. Raynaud, Le Contrat Collectif en France (2nd ed. 1921) part I.
33 ff. 52 ff.; Laroque, Rapport sur les Conventions Collectives du Travail.
1935 Bulletin du Minist~re du Travail, 26, 27. Particularly important are
the famous two collective agreements of Arras of 1891 and 1898, which re-
mained for a long time the basic regulation of the working conditions in
the mines of Pas-de-Calais.
-Cf. Raynaud, Le Contrat Collectif en France (2nd ed. 1921) 64.
47Cf. Laroque, Rapport sur les Conventions Collectives du Travail, as
reprinted in 1935 Bulletin du Minist~re du Travail. 13 ff., 27. For
more detail see Raynaud, Le Contrat Collectif en France, (2nd ed. 1921) 68(dealing with the building industry, metal workers, the chemical industry,
transportation, agriculture, and commerce). The number of these petty
agreements was, however, rather large; the Office du Travail listed 252 new
conventions in 1910, 202 in 1911, 104 in 1912, 67 in 1913. Cf. Laroque, Rap-
port sur les Conventions Collectives du Travail, as reprinted in extract form
in 1935 Bulletin du Minist~re du Travail 13 ff., 27.
0"An excellent survey about the actual practice of collective bargaining
in the different branches of French industry, commerce and agriculture be-
tween 1918 and 1933 is given in the Laroque report as reprinted in extract
form in 1935 Bulletin du Minist~re du Travail, p. 32, 33 and 44 ff. Most
of the conventions are only local in character and on October 15th, 1933,
only 7.5 per cent of the workers were benefited by such agreements.
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tried to establish the reasons for this.49 The report grouped them
under three headings, namely, (a) the progress of social legisla-
tion, which dispensed in some respects with the necessity of such
agreements, (b) the resistance of the employers toward them
(owing at least to some extent also to the competition of rival
unions), and (c) the lack of strength on the part of the unions,50
which was caused, among other factors, particularly those of
political nature, in part by the peculiar feature of French indus-
trialism, namely the absence of concentration. "" Besides, French
unionism itself was for a long period adverse to collective bar-
gaining. The program of revolutionary syndicalism was opposed
to any cooperation of classes. It was only after the war that the
C.G.T. made the extension of collective bargaining one of its aims.
2
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF COLLECTIVE LABOR
AGREEMENTS PRIOR TO 1936.-In spite of the comparatively re-
stricted importance which the collective labor agreements actually
possessed, their legal treatment soon became a considerable
problem. Until the legal recognition of labor unions in 1884, of
course, it was more than doubtful whether such agreements would
be valid; and, indeed, in 1876 a lower court declared categorically
that a clause in an agreement binding the workers and employers
to comply with a wage tariff resulted in "an alienation of individual
freedom" and was "absolutely void because of being contrary to
the rules of public order." 3 But after the statute of 1884, the
validity of collective labor agreements was no longer seriously
questioned.54 The problem from then on consisted rather in
49The Laroque report on Collective Labor Agreements in France.50Extract, 1935 Bulletin du Minist~re du Travail, 55 ff. Other writers
also have pointed to the reasons why collective bargaining did not possess
any greater effectiveness. Cf. Tardy, Le Riglement Amiable des Conflits
Collectifs du Travail, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, March, 1929, 425 ff.,
443; Colson, Le Role des Syndicats dans les Conventions et les Conflits
Collectifs du Travail, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, April, 1929, 18.
51Cf. Laroque report, as reprinted in 1935 Bulletin du Ministre du
Travail, 63.52Cf. Laroque report, as reprinted in 1935 Bulletin du Ministare du
Travail, 23. Only a few unions, particularly the printers, made collective
bargaining one of the union purposes, as early as 1888. Cf. Raynaud, Le
contrat collectif en France (2nd ed. 1921) 52. In contrast thereto, in Germany
collective bargaining became an object of general union policy before the
close of the 19th century. Cf., Lotmar, Der Arbeitsvertrag (1902) 758.53Tribunal civil de Saint tienne, June 29th, 1876 cited by Moissenet,
Etude sur les Contrats Collectifs en Matire de Conditions du Travail (1903)
130 and by Planiol, note (1903) Dalloz, Receuil P6riodique, part 2. 25.
"4Cf. Planiol, (1903) Dalloz, Rec. Pr. part 2, 25. The validity was
admitted regardless of whether the contracting party was a labor union
possessing limited legal personality under the statute of 1884, or a federation
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working out their legal effects in detail. Two periods must be
distinguished at this stage, namely, first, the period of judicial and
theoretical elaboration, and, later, the period of statutory inter-
vention.
I. The period of judicial and theoretical elaboration, (1884-
1919).-On the continent the arm of the legislature is frequently
slow, and it was so in the case of the collective labor agreements.
Courts and textwriters had therefore to face alone the job of fitting
these new social categories into the traditional framework of the
French legal order. Not until 1919 was a statute regarding col-
lective agreements passed. Courts and textwriters, however, were
busy with them from the start. It is interesting to note that while
in the United States it took until 1924 for collective bargaining
agreements to become a legitimate topic of legal literature,55 in
France the theoretical writers offered their aid almost immediately
for the solution of the judicial difficulties50
The questions to be solved were to an amazing degree the same
as those which arise today in the American system :r What was
of unions not endowed with these privileges under the statute of 1884; cf.
Tribunal Civil de Cholet, February 12th, 1897, (1903) Dalloz Rec. P~r., part
2, 25.55It was apparently Professor Fuchs who first devoted a detailed study
to the American law of collective labor agreements in the article, Collective
Labor Agreements in American Law, (1924) 10 St. Louis L. Rev. 1.
Mt is impossible to list the whole literature. We mention in the order
of time: Lambert, Du Contrat en Faveur de Tiers (1893) 354 ff.: Hubert-
Valleroux, De la Capacit6 Civile des Syndicats Professionnels, (1898)
R~forme Sociale, 314; Raynaud, Le Contract Collectif de Travail (1901);
Pic, Capacit6 Civile des Syndicats Professionnels, (1902) 1 Revue Trimes-
trielle de Droit Civil 499; Jay, Qu' est-ce que le Contrat Collectif de Travail,
(1907) Revue d'Economie Politique 565; Passama, Les Conventions Col-
lectives Relatives aux Conditions de Travail (1908); Nast, Des Conventions
Collectives Relatives a l'Organization du Travail (1908); Rouast, Essai
sur la Notion Juridique du Contrat Collectif (1909); Pirou, Les Conceptions
Juridiques Successives du Contrat Collectif de Travail (1909); Georgesco,
La Nature Juridique du Contrat Collectif de Travail (1914); Cr~pin, La
Convention Collective de Travail (1919); Louis-Lucas, Les Conventions
Collectives de Travail, (1919) 18 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, 66;
Morel, Les Conventions Collectives de Travail, (1919) 18 Revue Trimes-
trielle de Droit Civil 417; Raynaud, Le Contrat Collectif en France (2nd
ed. 1921) part 1; Pirou, The Theory of the Collective Labour Contract in
France, (1922) 5 International Labour Review 35; Lambert, Pic, Garraud,
The Sources and the Interpretation of Labour Law in France, (1926) 14
International Labour Review 19; Pic, Trait6 Pl-mentaire de Lgislation In-
dustrielle (6th ed. 1930) 873; and the important notes by Planiol, (1895)
Dalloz, Rec. Per., part 2,553; (1898) Rec. P&r. part 2, 129; (1903) Rec.
Pir. part 2, 25, 31; by Capitant (1909) Rec. P6r. part 33; by Nast (1911)
Rec. Per. part 1, 201; (1912) Rec. P6r. part 2, 289; Pic (1925) Rec. Pr.
part 2, 1. Noteworthy also is the comparative survey by the International
Labour Office, Collective Agreements, Studies and Reports Series A No. 39.
(1936).57The American problems of the collective labor agreements law are
discussed by Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1924)
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the nature of the collective agreements, how did they affect the legal
relations between the employer and the individual worker, what
were the consequences of their violation, who could enforce them,
what clauses might they contain and what were the reasons of
their termination? Courts and textwriters attempted at first-
similarly to the methods of the American courts5 8 -to put this
new social and economic institution upon the Procrustes bed of
individualistic legal concepts, and worked with notions such as
agency, contract for the benefit of third persons, negotiorum
gestio (a specific civil law devise"), and the like. Later, how-
ever, the textwriters progressed more or less to the view that
there was a new kind of contractual relationship, which had to be
explained in terms of collectivistic, not individualistic, notions. 0
The courts, which were naturally less daring owing to the absence
of any statutory basis, tried their best to do justice to the function
of the collective labor agreements. They developed the following
legal principles:
a) The collective agreement between an employer or an em-
ployers association on the one side and a labor union or a federation
of labor unions on the other, created a valid contract which was
binding on the individual members of such association or union,
if they either ratified it expressly or did not withdraw within a
reasonable time after its conclusion, or joined the association or
union while it was in force.6
10 St. Louis L. Rev. 1. Rice, Collective Labor Agreements, (1931) 44
Harv. L. Rev. 572; Anderson, Collective Bargaining Agreements, (1936)
15 Oregon L. Rev. 229; Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Court,(1938) 48 Yale L. J. 194; Note, (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 520.5sCf. Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, (1924) 10
St. Louis L. Rev. 1. Rice, Collective Labor Agreements, (1931) 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 572; Anderson, Collective Bargaining Agreements, (1936) 15 Oregon
L. Rev. 229; Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Court, (1938)
48 Yale L. J. 194; Note, (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 520.59See Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil
Law, (1927) 13 Corn. L. Qu. 190; Hope, Officiousness, (1929) 15 Corn. L.
J. 25.
6OCf. particularly Duguit, Manuel de Droit Constitutionnel (1907), 549;
Duguit, Les Transformations G6nrales du Droit Priv6 (1912), 131 ff.;
Duguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished From Contracts, (1918) 27 Yale
L. J. 753: Jay, Qfi est-ce que le Contrat Collectif de Travail (1907) Revue
d'Economie Politique 565; Saleilles, Note sur le Contrat Collectif de Travail,(1908) Bulletin de la Soci~t6 d'Etudes Lgislatives (1908) 79; Rouast, Essai
sur la Notion Juridique du Contrat Collectif (1909) Pirou, Les Conceptions
Juridiques Successives du Contrat Collectif de Travail (1909).61Court of Cassation, July 7th, 1910, (1911) Dalloz, Rec. Par., Part 1,
201 (with note by Nast) ; Court of Cassation, Jan. 15th, 1918, (1918) Rec. Pr.
part 1, 17. The Court of Appeals of Paris, Feb. 16th, 1911, (1912) Rec.
P6r. part 2, 289 held, however, that members of an employers association
were not bound individually, unless the charter of the association expressly
authorized such contract or the individual members ratified it specifically.
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b) Outsiders were normally not bound by it.6' The French
Supreme Court suggested, however, in one decision, that a collec-
tive agreement might create a usage which would be binding on
outsiders,13 and some lower courts have so held. 4
c) The employer and employee were at liberty to conclude
valid individual contracts contrary to and in violation of the pro-
visions of a collective agreement, unless the particular stipulation
disregarded possessed the special sanctity of constituting public
policy 15 (or, as the French say, order public 6 ). This was true,
even if the nullity of any contrary individual contract was ex-
pressly stipulated by the parties to the collective agreement. But
the validity of such individual contract between the parties thereto
did not necessarily per se preclude that its conclusion constituted
(1) a breach of the duty not to negotiate separately and differently
from the collective agreement, which might exist between the in-
dividual employer or employee and his association or union respec-
tively, and (2) a breach of the collective labor agreement itself,
making the employer (as would usually be the case) liable to the
labor union. While an affirmative answer to the first problem did
not offer any particular difficulties, the second question caused
great trouble because its solution depended on the capacity of a
labor union to sue upon a collective agreement in general.
d) The Court of Cassation (i.e. the French Supreme Court)
in an early decision denied to a labor union the right to sue in its
own name for damages resulting from the non-performance of
the obligations assumed by an employer in an agreement with the
plaintiff ;67 the court stated that the plaintiff had suffered no dam-
ages, but only the individual worker, that the collective agreement
in question was concluded by the labor union not in its own name
as party to the contract, but only as agent for the workers belonging
132Court of Cassation, Jan. 15th, 1918, Rec. P6r. part 1, 17; Court of
Cassation, April 1st, 1919, (1920) Dalloz, Rec. Pr. part 1, 45.
633Court of Cassation, Jan. 15th, 1918, (1918) Rec. P6r. part 1, 17; but
contra, at least partly, semble, Court of Cassation, Feb. 22nd, 1926, (1926)
Dalloz, Rec. Hebd. 221.
e4Cf. Morel, Les Conventions Collectives de Travail (1919), 18 Revue
Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, 422, note 3; see also Demogue, Note, (1926) 25
Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 763.
65Court of Cassation, Dec. 16th, 1908, (1909) Dalloz, Rec. P&r., part 1,
76; Court of Cassation, July 7th, 1910, (1911) Dalloz, Rec. Pr. Part 1,
201; Court of Cassation, August 2nd, 1911, (1912) Dalloz, Rec. P6r. part 1,
76. Professor Raynaud, Le Contrat Collectif en France (2nd ed. 1921), 153
cites some lower courts contra, but the cases listed do not seem to bear out
this proposition.
66As to the concept of "ordre public" see Husserl, Public Policy and
Ordre Public, (1938) 25 Va. L. Rev. 37.67Court of Cassation, Feb. 1st, 1893, (1893) Dalloz, Rec. P6r., part 1, 241.
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to the union. It was doubtful how far the decision went on general
principles, and how far on the particular facts of the case. The
American reader ought to remember here that the French judicial
technique and the bearing of a decision is not entirely comparable
to the common law state of affairs. At any rate it remained the
only pronouncement of the supreme court on a damage suit by a
union for breach of contract. Since the French Supreme Court
later very liberally permitted professional groups and unions to
vindicate their "collective interests" by means of tort actions., '
the lower courts concluded also that a collective agreement, if, as
normally, entered into by the union in its own name, would consti-
tute a sufficient collective interest to be protected by an action.'"
This departure from or restriction of the principles laid down by
the Supreme Court was encouraged by the te.xtwriters.70 The lower
courts seemed to disagree, however, as to whether the labor union
could only sue for a decree commanding performance in the future.
or also for damages for past breaches. The courts seem finally to
have reached the result that a union could sue for a mandatory
decree to compel payment of the back wages and performance of
the agreement in the future, and for its own damages if it could
sufficiently prove the same.71 If the agreement was concluded by
a federation of unions the federation could not sue, because the
statute of 1884 did not give it any standing in court; but the
affiliated unions apparently had a right of action under such agree-
ment.7 2  Not only was the individual employer liable in damages,
but, as at least some dicta indicate, also the employers association.
68The most famous decision in this line of cases is the opinion rendered
by the combined civil and criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation,
April 5th, 1913, (1914) Dalloz, Rec. P&r., part 1, 65. See also the notes
by Planiol and Capitant, (1895) Dalloz, Rec. Plr., part 2, 553 and (1909)
Rec. P&r., part. 33.69Cases are cited by Planiol, Note to a decision by the Tribunal Civil
de Cholet, Feb. 12th, 1897, (1903) Dalloz, Rec. P&r., part 2, 25 (granting
a mandatory decree for performance) ; and by Capitant, Note to a decision
by the Court of Appeals of Lyons, March 10th, 1908, (1909) Dalloz, Rec.
P&r., part 2, 33 (affirming partly a lower court decision by granting a
mandatory decree for performance and payment of the back wages to the
workers, but denying special damages to the union).
70See the notes by Planiol, Note to a decision by the Tribunal Civil
de Cholet, Feb. 12th, 1897, (1903) Dalloz, Rec. Per., part 2, 25 and
Capitant, Note to a Decision by the Court of Appeals of Lyons, March
10th, 1908 (1909) Dalloz, Rec. P&r., part 2, 33.
7
1See the note by Capitant to a decision by the Court of Appeals of
Lyons, March 10th, 1908 (1909) Dalloz, Rec. P&r., part 2, 33, where he states
that the disagreement relates rather to the appreciation of damages, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals of Lyons, Dalloz, Rec. P&r., part 2, 23.72Tribunal Civil de Cholet, Feb. 12th, 1897, (1903) Dalloz, Rec. Pr.
part 2, 25.
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if it was the contracting party and had caused the breach. One
court indeed went so far as to intimate that an employers associa-
tion would be liable for breach of contract, even when the in-
dividual employers committing the acts complained of were- not,
because they had not ratified the agreement. 73  Upon ihese
principles it was only logical that the conclusion of an individual
contract between an employer and an employee contrary to a col-
lective agreement was also held to constitute a cause of action for
the union.
7
'
e) What was the effect of a collective agreement upon the
right to strike, and vice versa of a strike upon the collective agree-
ment? While strikes were penal offenses until 1864, they ceased
to be so by virtue of the statute of that year, which changed sections
414-416 of the Penal Code and put limitations only on the exercise
of the right to strike in certain disapproved manners. These
restrictions were alleviated by the repeal of section 416 in 1884.71
Strikes then, as such, undoubtedly ceased to be a criminal offense
as well as a tort. It became recognized that unions calling a strike
did not incur tort liability, provided that the strike was for the
purpose of improving working conditions and not an illegal end.78
This did not exclude, however, the fact that a strike always consti-
tuted a breach of the individual labor contract terminating the
same.7 Did this rule have the consequence that calling a strike
by the union also constituted a breach of the collective agreement,
thereby terminating it and rendering the union liable? In a case
where the collective agreement contained a specific "no strike-no
lockout" clause, it was held that a strike rendered the party causing
it liable in damages.7 8 There was no legal difficulty in reaching this
73Court of Appeals of Paris, Feb. 16th, 1911, (1912) Dalloz, Rec. P6r.,
part 2, 289, with note by Nast contra.7UTribunal Civil de Beauvais, Oct. 20th, 1911, (1912) Dalloz, part
2, 294; accord Capitant, Note (1903) Rec. P&r., part 2, 25, 31; Nast, Note(1911) Dalloz, Rec. Per., part 1, 201.
75Cf. supra. p. 411.7aCourt of Cassation, Jan. 25th, 1905, (1905) Dalloz, Rec. P&r., part
1, 153 with note by Planiol (strike was legal) ; Court of Cassation, June
22nd, 1892, (1892) Dalloz, Rec. P6r., part 1, 449 (threats of strike in order
to effect discharge of worker who had quit the union are a tort) ; but cf.
Court of Cassation June 9th, 1896, (1896) Dalloz, Rec. P6r., 1, 582(dictum that threats of strike to effect dismissal of foreman for professional
reasons would be lawful).
77Court of Cassation, May 7th, 1904, (1904) Dalloz, Rec. Pr., part
1, 289; Court of Cassation, March 15th, 1907, (1907) Dalloz, Rec. P&r.,
part 1, 369; Court of Cassation, July 7th, 1921, (1922) Dalloz, Rec. Pr.,
part 1, 217, with note by Nast. It may be added that picketing, if done in
an intimidating manner, constitutes an offense, Trib. Correctionnel de la
Seine, Oct. 26th, 1938, (1939) 2 Droit Social 34.78Tribunal de Mulhouse, June 28th, 1923, (1925) Dalloz, Rec. P6r.,
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result. But the Court of Cassation held in another case, even
without referring to such clause, that a strike terminated the col-
lective agreement.tm It would logically follow that at least in some
circumstances, the calling of a strike during a collective agreement
would render the union liable in damages, even in the absence of a
special no-strike clause.""
f) The last point to be mentioned is the dosed shop. French
law put quite an emphasis on the freedom of hiring and firing con-
tained in the freedom of work. But this freedom was not free
from limitations. It was a tort to fire a man merely because he
was a union officer,"' or to refuse to hire union men out of malice
against the union.82  Conversely a union could not enjoin yellow
dog contracts when the employer's motive was not hostility against
the union, but his own professional interest under special circum-
stances.83 Could the employer then on his part assume the duty
to hire only union men? The courts were at first reluctant to give
effect td such obligation ;S4 later, however, the Court of Cassation
permitted such a contract if it was concluded for a limited time and
space and in the absence of malice, and denied a tort action by the
fired workers against the union. 5 On the other hand the court de-
dared recently that such agreement would not justify the dis-
missal of employees hired prior to the agreement because of their
non union status and that they could sue the employer for wrong-
ful discharge.""
part 2, 5 with note by Pic (damages of 300 francs(!) to the employers'
association by reason of a strike called a few days before the expiration of
the collective agreement).79Court of Cassation, May 1st, 1923, (1923) Dalloz, Rec. Per., part
1, 66.8oProfessor Morel in his article Les Conventions Collectives de Travail
(1919) 18 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 417, 447, argued, however, that
strikes not concerning matters regulated by the collective agreement are no
breach thereof and that even strikes for the purpose of altering such agree-
ment are no breach, in case the agreement was concluded for an indefinite
period.81Court of Cassation, May 27th, 1910, (1911) Dalloz, Rec. Pr., part
1, 223.
s2Court of Cassation, March 13th, 1905, (1906) Dalloz, Rec. Pir.,
part 1, 113. Lower courts considered even the general refusal to hire union
men without any malice to be tortious, Tribunal Comm. d'Apernay, February
28th, 1906; Tribunal Civil de Lille, Nov. 12th, 1906, (1906) Dalloz, Rec
P&r., part 2, 75.83Court of Cassation, March 9th, 1915, (1916) Dalloz, Rec. Pir.
part 1, 25, with critical note by Planiol (anti-union clause in orchestra
contract).8 4Cf. the decisions of the Justice of the Peace of Bordeaux, August
18th, 1903 and of the Tribunal Civil de Bordeaux of December 14th
1903, (1906) Dalloz, Rec. P6r., part 1, 113.85Court of Cassation, Oct. 24th, 1916, (1916) Dalloz, Rec. Per., part I
246. 8 6Court of Cassation, March 9th, 1938, (1938) Dalloz, Rec. Hebdoma
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II. The first period of statutory intervention, (1919-1936).-
The government had planned since 1906 to aid the courts in their
task of shaping a law of collective bargaining, but its legislative
project of that year.8 7 did not pass the two Houses. It was not
until the post-war period that a general statute regarding the col-
lective agreements was passed. This is the law of March 25th,
1919. It did not make any radical change in the system worked
out by the courts; rather it codified the existing law and clarified
and developed it on certain dubious questions.8 9 One of the most
controversial points in the legislative debates antecedent to the
enactment of the statute had been whether the government should
have the power to extend collective agreements to outsiders by
means of an administrative order.90 The bill as finally passed did
not adopt this system of compulsory extension of labor agreements,
but kept their character as voluntary agreements.
The whole statute was enacted as part of the French Labor
Code, of whose first book it formed the second title. It starts out
with a definition of collective agreements:
"The collective labor agreement is a contract regarding work-
ing conditions concluded on the one side by representatives of a
labor union or any other group of employees and on the other
by an employers' association or any other group of employers or
several employers contracting individually, or even by one em-
ployer alone." 91
Then follows an enumeration of the conditions under which
the officers of a union or employers association are authorized to
conclude collective agreements. 2 To be valid the agreement must
daire 305 (in this case there was the additional fact present that the
employer prior to the conclusion of the closed shop agreement had induced
the plaintiff to quit the union).
17As to this governmental project and suggested improvements, see
Colson, Rapport sur les Conventions Collectives Relatives aux Conditions
du Travail, Reprint from (1907) Bulletin de la Soci~t6 d'Atudes L.gislatives.
68Journal Officiel, March 28, 1919; (1919) Dalloz, Bulletin Lgislatif
174.
BOThe statute is commented upon by Louis-Lucas, Les Conventions
Collectives de Travail (1919) 18 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, 66;
Morel, Les Conventions Collectives du Travail (1919) 18 Revue Trime-
strielle de Droit Civil 417; Pic, Trait6 R16mentaire de Lgislation Indus-
trielle (6th ed. 1930) 875.
DOThis was proposed by the Senate Commission charged with the study
of the bill, but the Senate did not adhere to this proposal, Cf. Morel, Les
Conventions Collectives de Travail, (1919) 429.
"'Labor Code, book 1, title 2, art. 31, as enacted by stat. March 25th,
1919.
'
2Labor Code, book 1, title 2, art. 31 b: "The representatives of a
union or any other professional organization can contract in the name of the
collectivity by virtue either of charter provisions of this organization or
a special deliberation of this organization or by special and written authoriza-
tions which are given to them individually by all members of this organiza-
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be in writing and filed with certain local governmental agencies
in the places where it was concluded and where it is going to be
applied.93  It cannot be concluded for a period longer than five
years.9 4
The most important provisions are those dealing with the
persons who are bound by such agreement and the methods of its
enforcement. As far as the binding force of the collective agree-
ment with respect to different persons is concerned, the system of
the new statute constituted a departure from the old law and estab-
lished rather fine distinctions. Bound by the collective agreements
are, in the first place the signatories of the agreement and persons
who gave a special written authorization; second, all persons who
are members of the contracting groups, unless they withdraw with-
in a week after the filing of the agreement from the group; in the
third place, members of groups which subsequently adhere to the
agreement, unless they withdraw under similar circumstances; in
the fourth place new members of the organizations which are
bound; and in the fifth place employers who later adhere to it
individually.95 The statute further provided that a person bound
by a collective agreement must apply it also to his legal relations
with third persons, unless there was a specific clause to the con-
trary.96
In determining the effect of this binding force on the individual
labor relations, the statute distinguished two situations. In the
first, both employer and employees are bound by the statute. Then
the collective agreement can no longer be abrogated by individual
agreements, in sharp contrast to the previously existing law.9 7 In
the second situation only one of the parties, either the employer or
the employee, is bound. Then the party thus bound is only pre-
sumed to have applied the agreement, unless he stipulates to the
tion. Otherwise in order to be valid the collective labor agreement must be
ratified by a special deliberation of this organization."
93Labor Code, book 1, title 2, art. 31c.94Labor Code, book 1, title 2, art. 31g.
95Labor Code, book 1, title 2, art. 31k.
9GLabor Code, Book 1, title 2, art. 31a.97Labor Code, Book 1, title 2, art. 31g. The Court of Cassation con-
cluded that a collective agreement, being binding on employer and employee,
abrogates clauses in a previous individual agreement which are to the
contrary, Court of Cassation, Nov. 17th, 1937, (1938) Dalloz, Recueil
Hebdomadaire 68. The acceptance of an inferior salary does not estop
the worker to claim the balance. Tribunal Civil de la Seine, June 23rd,
1937, (1938) 1 Droit Social 146. The statute was overlooked by the Civil
Tribunal of St. Nazaire, July 21st, 1922, (1925) Dalloz, Rec. P6r., part 2, 1,
which still applied the old rule.
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contrary. But, if he does so, he will be liable in damages." The
system of the statute is consequently that the employer can stipu-
late in the collective agreement that he wants to apply it only to
the members of the contracting union. If he does so, he is free
to make individual contracts with outsiders; if he fails to do so, he
still can make valid individual contracts in variance from the col-
lective agreement; but he is presumed not to have done so, and if
he explicitly has done so, he will be liable in damages for failure
specifically to secure this right in the collective agreement. Thus
far, consequently, the old system has been preserved.91
With respect to the content of the obligation, the statute defines
it as "the forbearance to do any act of a nature, so as to com-
promise the loyal performnace of the obligation."'10  A breach
entitles the plaintiff to damages. Who can sue? This was a
difficult question under the old law. The new statute contains a
specific regulation. It distinguishes between a right of action by
the union (provided it possesses the capacity to sue) 10 1 and the
right of action by the individual. 1 2 The right of action by the
union is quite independent of the right of action by the individual,
but-and herein lies a great innovation-the union can also
exercise the right of action of any of its individual members, pro-
vided that he does not oppose such exercise.10 3
A statute of 1920 finally extended the capacity to sue to the
federation of unions, which until then were deprived of this
98Statute, March 25th, 1919 art. 1, as enacting Book 1, title 2, art. 31
r. of the Labor Code.
9aCf. Morel, Les Conventions Collectives de Travail (1919) 18 Revue
Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, 448, 449. How about a worker who has
made a special contract with an employer, bound by a collective agreement,
and later joins the labor union? Is his special contract thereby abrogated?
The answer is yes. Court of Cassation, Feb. 9th, 1938, (1938) 1 Droit
Social 144. But if originally neither the employer nor the worker was
bound by an agreement, the mere fact that the worker later joined a union
which was a party to a collective agreement does not alter the individual
contract. Tribunal Civil de la Seine, March 25th, 1937, (1938) 1 Droit
Social 145. A connected problem is as to whether there is any form
required for such contract in deviation from a collective agreement binding
only upon one of the parties to the individual contract? The Tribunal Civil
de Marseille, Feb. 9th, 1938, (1938) 1 Droit Social 144, required writing.10OLabor Code, book 1, title 2, art. 31s.01
°Labor Code, book 1, title 2, art. 31t.
0'-0 Labor Code, book 1, title 2, art. 31u.
103Labor Code, book 1, title 2, art. 31v. What acts constitute such
opposition? Does the acceptance of a lower salary suffice? It ought not
to, because otherwise the rule that stipulations contrary to a collective
agreement are invalid would be largely illusory; but see contra Tribunal
Civil de Saint Nazaire, Statute, March 25th, 1919, (1925) Dalloz Rec. P6r.,
part 2, 1. At any rate such opposition does not destroy the union's own
right of action. Accord, Tribunal Civil de Saint Nazaire, loc. cit., granting
damages of 1 franc I
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privilege. 10 4 But all this legislative favor to collective agreements
resulted only in a temporary bloom. 05 For the reasons mentioned
at the beginning of this chapter, collective bargaining became very
retrogressive from 1925 on, and even in the industries where such
agreements had existed they disappeared. The French govern-
mental authorities began to be concerned, and the National Eco-
nomic Council made an investigation into the situation. 0 The
reporters made a splendid survey and pointed out that the Council
could take one of three points of view, viz.:
1. That the present state of industrial relations could not be
improved upon by collective bargaining;
2. That collective agreements voluntarily entered into would
constitute a desirable and effective factor for the improvement of
working conditions.
3. That the application of collective agreements should be
extended and the same transformed into general labor regulations
by means of administrative action.
The Council concluded that the voluntary system was the
desirable one, and that the most important thing to do was to
build up a morale of collective bargaining, and to break down the
national trait of particularism in industry.
Such was the state of affairs in 1936, when the Popular Front
won the election.
PART II.
THE "NEw ORDER"
When Premier Blum took over the power in the midst of the
spreading sit-down strikes, his first radio address listed, as has
been told in the introduction, the reform of collective bargaining
as one of the three chief legislative measures to be taken by the
government. Looking back now at the legislation which fol-
lowed'07 two different stages of it can be distinguished.
10 4Statute of March 12th, 1920, (1920) DalIoz, Bulletin LUgislatif 130.1O'The numbers of the newly concluded labor agreements were: 557 in
1919, 345 in 1920, 159 in 1921, 196 in 1922, 144 in 1923, 177 in 1924, 126 in
1925, 238 in 1926, 58 in 1927, 99 in 1928, 112 in 1929, 72 in 1930, 17 in 1931,
23 in 1932, 20 in 1933. Cf. Laroque, Rapport sur les Conventions Collec-
tives du Travail, reprinted in extract form in (1935) Bulletin du Ministre
du Travail 13, at 33.
lO6Cf. the extract from the Laroque, Rapport sur les Conventions Collec-
tives du Travail, reprinted in extract form in report to the Council, (1935)
Bulletin du Ministare du Travail 13.
2
0 7 For the literature on the new phase of French labor law, see Debr6,
Comment on the Statute of June 24th, 1936, in (1936) Dalloz, Rec. P&.,
part 4, 369; Pic, Autour de ]a Loi du 24 Juin sur les Conventions Collectives
de Travail, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, September, 1936, 393; the
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1. THE FIRST STEP: THE AccoRD OF MATIGNON AND THE
STATUTE OF JUNE 24TH, 1936.
Premier Blum's first action was to summon representatives of
the Confederation G6n~rale du Travail which was now, after the
end of the split with the Conf6ddration du Travail Unitaire, by far
the most influential workers' organization, and representatives of
the Conf6deration G6n6rale de la Production Franqaise which was
the top organization of French capital.
These representatives reached a famous agreement on the eve-
ning of June 7th, 1936, which is called the Matignon Accord after
the hotel where it was concluded. It provided, among other things
(such as an increase of wages from 7 to 15 per cent and the waiver
of any claims resulting from the strikes), that the working condi-
tions for each region and each industry should be established in
future by collective agreements freely discussed between the indus-
trial groups, that employers and employees obligate themselves to
respect the right and the freedom of organization, and that in any
plant employing more than ten workers a representation of the
personnel should be instituted." 8 This accord was hailed by Mr.
Jouhaux, Secretary General of the C.G.T. in a radio speech of the
next day as the foundation of a "new order."
In consequence of this accord 09 a bill was passed on'june 24th,
1936, which "modified and completed" the existing law of collective
labor agreements. 1 0  It contained two important innovations,
namely (a) governmental promotion of collective bargaining of a
special type and (b) administrative extension of agreements thus
same, De l'Accord Matignon A la Loi du 31 December, 1936, sur l'Arbitrage
Obligatoire, Revue Politique et Parlementaire March, 1937, 446; the same,
Les Nouvelles Lois Ouvrires, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Nov.
1937, 214; the same, Le Regime du Travail, Revue Politique et Parlemen-
taire, June 1938, 424; Lautman, Les Progr s du Facteur Collectif en
Droit Frangais, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, March 1937, 431; Villey,
Chronique du Syndicalisme, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, April 1937,
124; Gignoux, Le Statut Moderne du Travail, Revue Politique et Parle-
mentaire, February, 1938, 201; Maurette, A Year of "Experiment" in
France, (1937) 36 International Labour Review 1 ff., 149 ff.; Pouillot,
Collective Labor Agreements in France, (1938) 37 International Labour
Review, 1.
lOBPic, Autour de la Loi du 24 Juin 1936, etc., Revue Politique et
Parlementaire, September, 1936, 394.
109It might be mentioned as an interesting historical parallel that the
German Collective Labor Agreements Act of December 23rd, 1918, also
was preceded by a similar accord of the top organizations of capital and
labor on November 15th, 1918. Cf. 2 Hueck-Nipperdey, Lehrbuch des
Arbeitsrechts (3rd ed. 1932) 36.
"10 Statute of June 24th, 1936, Journ. Off. June 26th, 1936, (1936)
Dalloz Bulletin LUgislatif 409.
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reached to outsiders. The details of these two new legal institu-
tions are regulated as follows:
(a) At the request of an industrial organization, either of
employers or workers, which has a legitimate interest the minister
of labor or his representative must summon a mixed commission,
with the view to the conclusion of a collective labor agreement
having as its object the regulation of the relations between em-
ployers and workers of a determinate branch of industry or com-
merce for a special region or the whole territory."' This mixed
commission is composed of the representatives of the industrial
organizations, either employers or workers, which are "the most
representative ones" for the branch of commerce or industry in the
region concerned or in the whole territory, if a national agreement
is in question.112 The French system consequently is based on the
principle that it did not want to give to the majority union the
exclusive monopoly of collective bargaining as the American law
does. On the other hand not all the small faction unions should
have a voice in the negotiations. Thus the French resorted to the
celebrated compromise formula of "the most representative groups"
which had been used seventeen years before on the occasion of the
organization of the International Labor Conference in article 389
of the Treaty of Versailles'13 for the designation of the employers'
and workers' organizations which must be in accord with their
governments in the selection of the delegates. The renewed use of
this formula for the purposes of the French legislation on con-
ciliation had been recommended by M. Colson, one of the authors
of the statute of 1919, as early as 1929;'114 it was adopted after
some debates in the House and the Senate.115
If the mixed commission does not reach an accord on one or
several clauses which are to be incorporated into the agreement,
"'Stat. June 24th, 1936, art. 1, adding art. 31va to book 1, title 2 of
the Labor Code.
"12 Stat. June 24th, 1936, art. 1, adding art. 31vd., par. 2, to book 1,
title 2 of the Labor Code.
113(1919) 13 Am. Journ. International Law, Supplement 362.
"14Colson, Le Role des Syndicats dans les Conventions et les Conflits
du Travail, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, April 1929, 18, 28. The
French Supreme Arbitration Court decided on June 13th, 1938, Syndicat
Patronel du Commerce de la Quincaillerie (1938) 1 Droit Social 303 that
age alone does not suffice to attribute to a labor union the qualification of
belonging to the "most representative organization" within the meaning of
the statute. Other factors such as number of members, etc., and the nature
of its activity in comparison with other groups must be taken in consideration.
See Cuche, Revue Juridique, (1939) Dalloz, Rec. Hebd. 1, at 3.
i"Cf. the report of these debates by Debr6, (1936) Dalloz, Rec. Pr.,
part 4, 371.
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the minister of labor must intervene on the demand of one of the
parties for the purpose of rendering assistance in the settlement of
the dispute, after consultation of the appropriate sections of the
National Economic Council. 1 0 The minister has not arbitrational
but merely mediatorial powers. If the parties do not come to
terms even after his intervention, his mission has failed. In case
an agreement is concluded, the statute prescribes a list of stipula-
tions which must be incorporated, namely those concerning the
duration of the agreement; the recognition of the freedom of
organization and of the freedom of opinion of the workers; the
establishment of a workers' delegation in plants occupying more
than ten workers for the purpose of presenting complaints relating
to deficient application of the wage tariffs of health and safety
regulations etc.; the minimum wages for category and region;
paid vacations; organization of apprenticeship; the procedure by
which controversies regarding the application of the agreement
shall be settled and the procedure by which it can be revised or
modified.' 17  The collective agreement must be filed with the
minister of labor in addition to the filing prescribed under the
old law.
(b) The administrative extension to outsiders was probably
the most radical alteration of the existing situation. The new
statute""' empowered the minister of labor "to render a collective
agreement as concluded under the new provisions obligatory upon
all employers and employees of the trades and regions covered by
the field of application of the collective agreement." It provided
that "this extension of the effects and sanctions of the agreement
is made for the duration and under the conditions established by
the same." The ministerial decree can be rendered only after a
previous announcement in the French Journal Officiel of the im-
pending extension, coupled with an invitation to the groups and
persons concerned to take action within a period fixed by the
minister but not shorter than twro weeks. The minister of labor
must consult the National Economic Council.
The extension decree ceases to have effect by operation of
law, if the contracting parties rescind, revise or modify the agree-
'
16Stat. June 24th, 1936, Art. 1, as enacting art. 31vb of book 1, title
2 of the Labor Code. The National Economic Council was established by
a statute on April 29th, 1926, and reorganized by a statute of March 19th,
1936, (1936) Dalloz Bulletin Lgisl. 130. It is a consulting body.
"2'Statute of June 24th, 1936, art. 1, as enacting art. 3lvc, of book 1,
title 2, of the Labor Code.
"'
8 Statute of June 24th, 1936, art. I as enacting art. 31 vd, and ye, of
book 1, title 2 of the Labor Code.
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ment by mutual consent, and the minister can revoke the decree
under forms similar to its rendition, if one of the most representa-
tive groups announces it or if the agreement no longer corresponds
to economic conditions.
119
The new statute had a tremendous effect. To be sure, it did
not newly introduce collective bargaining. But while until its
enactment collective labor agreements were the exception and in-
dividual labor contracts the rule, the relationship of the two now
became reversed. 12 0 The law gave a special status to the collec-
tive agreements concluded by the most representative groups for
a determined branch of commerce or industry in a certain region.
It was its avowed purpose to resort to such collective agreements
as the means of vtoluntary consensual self-regulation of industrial
relations in the different branches of industry and commerce.
Agriculture was not included, but commerce was to be understood
in the broadest sense.' 2 ' The collective agreements of the new
kind were no longer only instruments for the settlement of certain
controversial points, but they had to cover the large range of issues
listed by the statute, being veritable labor relations codes or indus-
trial charters on a contractual basis.' 22 The intended generalization
of collective agreements as voluntary and consensual regulations
of industrial relations was further sought to be attained by vesting
in the minister of labor the power of extending them to minority
groups.
Of course, to this extent the collective agreement ceases to be
a convention in the strict sense and becomes transformed into a
governmental ordinance; but one must not forget that its content
is fixed by the most representative organizations in the industry
and not by the -government itself, and that even its life, as has
been mentioned, is dependent upon the continuing existence of the
contract which serves as its basis.' 23 Direct governmental inter-
"19 Decree of May 2nd, 1936, art. 14, amending art. 31 vf of book 1,
title 2 of the Labor Code, as enacted by stat. of June 24th, 1936, art. 1,
(1938) Dalloz Rec. Pr., part. 4, 227.
"2OCf. Pic, Autour de la Loi du 24 Juin 1936, etc., Revue Politique et
Parlementaire, September, 1936, 396; Maurette, A Year of "Experiment"
in France, (1937) 36 International Labour Review, 15, 16.
"'See the award of the final arbitrator, Professor Escarra, of De-
cember 12, 1937, in the case of the insurance employees of Lille, (1938) 1
Droit Social 147 declaring insurance agencies to be commerce within the
meaning of the statute. Accord, Supreme Arbitration Court, June 29th,
1938, (1938) 1 Droit Social 302.
122Cf. Pic, Autour de la Loi du 24 Juin 1936, etc., Revue Politique
et Parlementaire, September, 1936; Debr6, Comment on the Statute of June
24, 1936, Dalloz, Rec. Pr., part 4, 372.
"'3Even M. Gignoux, the secretary general of the national employers
FRENCH LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS
ference was thus quite restricted in favor of an industrial self-
government. The system was consequently quite different from
the Nazi or fascist totalitarian schemes, and much more similar
to the pre-Nazi German set-up, or the American NIRA arrange-
ment.12 4 It is, above all, still governed by the idea of the rule
of law. Thus the minister of labor is subject to the ordinary
judicial control of the Conseil d' Ptat, i.e. the supreme French
administrative court,"2" as to the legality of his extension decrees21
which can be attacked by the "writ of exceeding power." 127  The
Minister has made use of his power in a great number of instances;
he did so for the first time on November 18th, 1936, with respect
to the silk industry of the South East.12s The statute gave a
gigantic impulse to collective bargaining. On May 31st, 1937,
federation, acknowledged that fact in 1938, by stating:
"The legislation of 1936 was founded essentially upon the notion of
contract; it was substituted for what one calls a little pompously the play
of forces. This is an extremely interesting view which, according to us,lies on the foundation of any social restoration," Gignoux, Le Statut
-Moderne du Travail, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, September, 1936,
207.
124Cf. the slatement to this effect by Premier Blum in the Senate on
June 17th, 1936, Journal Officiel, June 18th, 1936, 523; and Pic, Autour de]a Loi du 24 Juin 1936, etc., Revue Politique et Parlementaire, September,
1936, 413. But the NIRA of June 16th, 1933, even though fostering collective
agreements and giving the President the power to extend them to outsiders(art. 7b), did not attribute to them all pervading importance, because its
main emphasis was laid upon the codes and limited codes of fair competi-
tion (art. 3 and art. 7c), which were not founded on a contractual basis.
Cf. Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements Under Administrative Regula-
tion of Employment, (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 493; Gallagher, Government
Rules Industry, A Study of the NRA (1934).
1 2 50n the French administrative courts and their functions cf. Riesen-
feld, The French System of Administrative Justice-A Model for American
Law? (1938) 38 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 48 ff., 400 ff., 715.
12 6Cf. Conseil d'Etat, July 22nd, 1938, (1938) Dalloz, Rec. Hebd. 535,
where this court, while dealing with the issue of the legality of an extension
decree, examined whether the unions, being parties to the agreement extend-
ed, were the most representative organizations, whether the plants concerned
constituted a "determinate branch of industry" and whether the agreement
possessed the content required by the statute. Furthermore the Conseil
d'Ptat on May 13th, 1938 annulled a decision of the Minister of Labor which
erroneously refused to allow a certain union to participate in the elaboration
of a collective labor agreement under the forms of the Statute of 1936,(1938) 1 Droit Social 377. However, the Conseil d'etat did not admit a writ
of review against the appointment of certain persons as arbitrators, stating
that so far the Supreme Arbitration Court had exclusive jurisdiction, May
27th, 1938, (1938) 1 Droit Social 285.
127 As to this writ, cf. Riesenfeld, The French System of Administra-
tive Justice-A Model for American Law? (1938) 38 Boston Univ. L. Rev.,
413 ff.
128Cf. Debr6, Comment on the Statute of June 24, 1936, (1936) Dalloz,
Rec. Pr., part 4, 369, 374.
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there existed 4,282 agreements regulating the working conditions
of two million employees.1
21
2. THE LATEST PHASE: COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A "SOCIAL JURISDICTION"
A. THE FIRST ATrEm'r: THE STATUTE OF DECEMBER 31ST,
1936, AND ITS HIsToRY.--The statute of June 24th, 1936, brought
a temporary appeasement, but only a short one. The sudden in-
crease of the wage scale and other reasons caused a terrific rise in
living expenses and wiped out the gain obtained by the Matignon
Accord and the collective agreements. Labor accused capital of the
attempt to commit sabotage against the new system. It tried to
counteract this obstruction, and from September on the sit-down
strikes became very numerous again and threatened to destroy the
national economy. The government felt the necessity to intervene.
It hoped for a solution from a compulsory arbitration and sum-
moned anew the representatives of the C.G.T. and C.G.P.F. to
the Hotel Matignon on September 14th, in order to work out a
basis for the new procedure. 130
France at this period had a statute of 1892 "on facultative
conciliation and arbitration in the matter of collective disputes
between employers and employees or workers." 131 But this statute,
as its title indicated, did not provide for any compulsory concilia-
tion or arbitration procedure, neither did it even set up permanent
bodies for the attempted settlement. All it did was to vest the
justices of the peace with the power to promote the formation of a
conciliation commission chosen by the parties and, in case of its
failure, of an arbitration council composed of members likewise
chosen by the parties, if and only if the parties agreed to submit
their dispute to them. 3 2 The justice of the peace could not act
on his own initiative except in the case of a strike, otherwise he
had to wait until he was asked to act by one of the parties.""' The
law at that period did not even permit the parties to stipulate in
129Cf. Maurette, A Year of "Experiment" in France, (1937) 36 Inter-
national Labour Review, 16.
'30Cf. Villey, Chronique du Syndicalisme, Revue Politique et Parlemen-
taire, April 1937, 124; Pic, De l'Accord Matignon a la Loi du 31 Dicember,
1936, sur l'Arbitrage Obligatoire, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, March,
1937, 446.
181(1893) Dalloz, Rec. Pir., part 4, 33.
182Even then an arbitral award was devoid of any legal sanction.
Only if both parties accepted it, was it transformed into a collective agree-
ment. Pic, Traiti Rlmentaire de LUgislation Industrielle (6th ed. 1930),
937.
1'8 Statute, Dec. 27th, 1892, art. 10, art. 2.
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advance for arbitration in case of a difference;134 only the statute
of 1919,3, gave effect to arbitration clauses in collective agreements
with the result that non-compliance constituted a breach.
It is obvious that such a system was quite feeble, and even
though it worked with some success for a certain period, the re-
turns were constantly decreasing13 and the necessity for a reform
had become more and more urgent for many years.137 The first
attempt to bring about such reform was a bill introduced by the
Ministers Millerand and Waldeck-Rousseau in 1900. It was fol-
lowed by the re-introduction of the bill by M. Millerand alone in
1906, and by the submission of other bills by Ministers Millerand
and Jourdain in 1920, by Minister Durafour in 1925, and by
Minister Loucheur in 1929. But none of these bills was passed,
the Loucheur Bill being under discussion until the events of
1936.138
The representatives of the C.G.T. and the C.G.P.F. met over
a long period of time, but they could not reach any accord. Then
the government secured an authorization from the Legislature, in-
serted in the monetary law of October 1st, 1936, to establish by
decree a conciliation and arbitration procedure for the adaptation
of the wage scale in case the living costs should increase consider-
ably before December 31st, 1936.' It made, however, no use of
184Court of Cassation, Jan. 25th, 1905, cited by Raynaud, Le Contrat
Collective en France (1921), 230.135Statute, March 25th, 1919, enacting art. 31x of book 1, title 2 of
the Labor Code; cf. Fuchs, French Law of Collective Labor Agreements
(1932) 41 Yale L. J. 1027.
136Cf. Pic, Trait6 Al~mentaire de Legislation Industrielle (6th ed. 1930)
938 ff.; and the statistical table in Raynaud Le Contrat Collective en France(1921), 26.
137As to the history of this reform attempts, cf. Pic, Trait6 Almentaire
de Ugislation Industrielle (6th ed. 1930) op. cit. 942; Tardy, Le R6glement
Amiable des Conflits du Travail, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, March
1929, 425; Pic, De l'Accord Matignon A la Loi du 31 D6cember, 1936, sur
l'Arbitrage Obligatoire, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, March, 1937,
462.
138The project Millerand-Waldeck Rousseau provided for arbitration
in State enterprises and private enterprises which had agreed in advance to
submit to it; it furthermore subjected any strike to a vote by secret ballot; cf.
Tardy, Le R~glement Amiable des Conflits du Travail, Revue Politique et
Parlementaire, March, 1929, 436. The project Millerand-Jourdain provided for
compulsory conciliation in all industries and optional arbitration, except in
public utilities, where the arbitration was to be compulsory. The project
Durafour was substantially the same. The Loucheur Bill finally provided
for a detailed compulsory conciliation procedure and optional arbitration.
Cf. the studies cited note 137, and Anonymous, L'tat et Les Conflits
Collectifs, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Nov. 1936, 256.13 9Statute of Oct. 1st, 1936, (1936) Journal Officiel, Oct. 2nd, 10402;
(1936) Dalloz Bulletin LUgislatif 759, art. 15 paragraph 2. This para-
graph was the result of a compromise in the legislature in order to avoid a
sliding wage scale dependent upon the indices of living costs.
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this authorization. On November 26th, 1936, the representatives
of the employers realized that owing to the increased vehemence
of the attacks against capital an accord could not be reached, and
notified the premier of this state of affairs. 140 The government
proceeded to draw up a bill of its own, and after many changes
in the Senate1 4 ' the statute of December 31st, 1936. regarding
conciliation and arbitration procedures 142 was passed. It provided
that "in industry and commerce the collective disputes must be
submitted to the procedures of conciliation and arbitration before
any strike or lockout.' 14 3 It provided further for arbitration by
two arbitrators, and in case of their disagreement by one final
arbitrator.144  It made the following regulation for the arbitra-
tion:
"The arbitration has as its object to establish an equitable
regulation of the working conditions with the view to create, in
the places of employment, an atmosphere of collaboration in the
respect of the mutual rights of the parties: right of property, right
of unionization, individual freedom, freedom of work, freedom of
organization.' 14 5
The statute empowered the government to establish by decree
the details of the procedure to be followed in the absence of a
regulation in the collective agreement, provided, however, that the
conciliation and arbitration procedure should be organized "within
the framework of the existing laws."' 46 This decree should remain
in effect, however, only until the end of the legislative session in
1937. The government made use of this authorization on January
16th, 1937, enacting a decree14  which prescribed first three dif-
ferent attempts at conciliation, and thereafter resort to arbitration.
Further details are hardly of interest. It is noteworthy only that
the period of the force of this decree was twice prolonged in spite
of its original restriction, namely, once by a statute of July 18th,
1937, until December, and again by a statute of January 18th, 1938.
until the end of February. It was further modified by a decree of
September 18th, 1937. The statute and also the decree were,
however, scarcely satisfactory owing to the haste with which they
14oCf. Pic, De l'Accord Matignon b. la Loi du 31 Dicember, 1936,
sur l'Arbitrage Obligatoire, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, March,
1937, 453, where the letter is reprinted in part.
'41Cf. Pic, ibid. 457.
34'(1937) Journ. Off. Jan. 1st, 127, (1936) Dalloz Bull. LUgislatif 1132.
'
43Stat. Dec. 31st, 1936 art. 1.
144Stat. Dec. 31st, 1936 art. 5, par. 2.
'
45Stat. Dec. 31st, 1936, art. 5, par. 3.
146Stat. Dec. 31st, 1936, art. 3, art. 5, par. 1.
147Journal Officiel Jan. 17th, 1937; printed as amended by decree
of Sept. 18th, 1937, in (1938) 1 Droit Social 13.
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were drawn. There were no sanctions against strike in violation
of the statute,"" no limitations on the "equitable" powers of the
arbitrators,'14 ' no provisions about judicial review of the awards60
and the question of their enforcement was more than drowned in
an ocean of controversies. 15 Thus it was no wonder that a new
statute was desired.
B. THE PRESENT STATUS: THE STATUTE OF MARCH 4TH, 1938.
1. The genesis of the new statute.-Monsieur Blum's Cabinet
had meanwhile resigned and Monsieur Chautemps had become
Premier of France. The Matignon Accord was to expire by the
end of 1937. Labor therefore had expressed its desire to reach a
new agreement between capital and labor as early as in August,
1937, but, discouraged by the attitude of the employers, the gov-
ernment took no action and concentrated on its own legislative
projects. Finally on January 7th, 1938, it summoned a new con-
ference again inviting the C.G.T. and the C.G.P.F., which had been
the parties to the Matignon Accord. But the employers' organiza-
tion insisted that other labor groups also should be invited, and
refused to negotiate with the C.G.T. alone; on January 12th it
declined definitely to accept the invitation.Y2 So the government
reverted to its own projects and tried to attack the problem of in-
dustrial relations by itself. It submitted six bills on various labor
issues, such as employment and discharge, placement, conciliation
and arbitration, collective bargaining, strike, plant representatives,
148Cf. the criticism of the law for this reason by Pic, De l'Accord
Matignon A la Loi du 31 Dfcembre, 1936, sur l'Arbitrage Obligatoire, Revue
Politique et Parlementaire, farch, 1937, 471 ff.
l4lCf. the criticism of the law for this reason by Savatier, Les Rayons
et les Ombres d'une Exp~rience Sociale: l'Arbitrage Obligatoire des Con-
flits Collectifs de Travail, (1938) Dalloz, Rec. Hebdom. 9, 11. The author
reminds the reader that one of the slogans before the French Revolution
of 1789 was "May God protect us from the equity of the Parliaments"(which was the name of the 13 supreme judicial bodies before the revolu-
tion), and expresses the fear that it might be revived under the statute of
1936 in the form of "MIay God protect us from the equity of the arbitrators."
See also Blondel, Nature and Port6e de 'Arbitrage Obligatoire, (1938)
I Droit Social 104, 108.
'"OThe Court of Cassation declared a writ of review to be inadmissible
,,n Dec. 7th, 1937, (1938) 1 Droit Social 20. Whether there could be a
writ of review to the Supreme Administrative Court was in dispute. Cf.
Note by Teitgen, (1938) 1 Droit Social 104, 111.,
, 5ZCf. Savatier, Les Rayons et les Ombres d'une Experience Sociale:
I'Arbitrage Obligatoire des Conflits Collectif de Travail, (1938) Dalloz,
Rec. Heb., 13; Pic, Le R6gime du Travail, Revue Politique et Parlemen-
taire. June, 1938, 428; Note by Savatier, (1938) 1 Droit Social 20; Note
by Reuter (1938) 1 Droit Social 111.U,2See Pic, Les Nouvelles Lois Ouvri~res, Revue Politique et Parle-
mentaire, November, 1937, 228; the same, Le, R~gime du Travail, Revue
Politique et Parlementaire, June, 1938, 435 ff.; Gignoux, Le Statut Moderne(lu Travail, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Februai-y, 1938, 202.
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combining them under a name of public appeal: the "Modern Char-
ter of Labor."''1 3 The project concerning conciliation and arbitra-
tion became law, after certain changes, on March 4th, 1938.1'"
IL The provisions of the new statute.-The statute applies, as
its predecessor did, to the settlement of collective disputes in com-
merce and industry. Agriculture is expressly reserved to a future
law. 15 The progress consists rather (a) in a simplification of the
conciliation and arbitration process in general, (b) in a restriction
of the powers of the arbitrators and (c) in the enactment of rules
for the enforceability and control of the awards.
a. With respect to the general rules pertaining to conciliation
and arbitration procedure, the new statute distinguishes again be-
tween two different kinds of procedure, namely (a) that which is
controlled by the collective agreements concluded under the condi-
tions of the statute of June 24th, 1936, i.e. by the most representa-
tive organizations for a determined branch of commerce or industry
in a determined region (conventional procedures), and (b) that
which is not controlled by these agreements and must therefore
be regulated by a governmental decree provided for by the statute
(decree procedure).
(1) The conventional procedures. The statute of June 24th,
1936 had provided that the collective agreements concluded under
the conditions of that statute must provide for conciliation and
arbitration procedures. The new statute adds that these procedures
should cover all collective labor disputes between the parties.156
The statute furthermore gives certain specific rules. 5 With re-
spect to conciliation it prescribes that the collective agreement
must provide for a conciliation commission composed of an equal
number of employer and employee representatives meeting under
the chairmanship of a Prefect, i.e. a high official in local govern-
ment. With respect to arbitration the new statute prescribes that
each party to the collective agreement has to designate one arbitra-
tor nominated for the duration of the agreement and some substi-
tutes. The collective agreement must furthermore contain a list
of "final arbitrators" made up by accord of the parties. If the
'58Cf. Note on "Le Statut Moderne du Travail" (1938) 1 Droit Social
128, and the articles by Gignoux and Pic., Revue Politique et Parlementaire,
February, 1938, 202; Revue Politique et Parlementaire, February, 1938,
228; Revue Politique et Parlementaire, June, 1938, 435 ff.
1540(1938) Journal Officiel, March 15th, 1938, (1938) 1 Droit Social 101.
'"GStatute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 7, Par. 3.
'"Statute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 1.
157Statute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 2, 3, 4, 5.
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parties cannot agree on such a list, the chief justice of the Court
of Appeal of the respective region will furnish it. If the two
arbitrators cannot reach a settlement of the dispute, then they have
to choose a "final arbitrator" from the list; if they cannot even
agree upon the person of the final arbitrator, the prefect or the
minister himself must select him.
(2) The decree procedure. In cases where no such conven-
tional procedure is available, the statute provides that a procedure
should be elaborated by governmental decree. The government
performed this duty and enacted a decree on April 20th, 1938.156
The decree establishes (1) one departmental conciliation com-
mission in each D6partment (i.e. a French administrative dis-
trict headed by the Prefect), consisting of an equal number of
employers and employees and being presided over by the Prefect;
and (2) national conciliation commissions connected with the de-
partments of the different ministers, likewise consisting of an
equal number of employers and employees. The selection of the
members of the departmental conciliation commissions is made
by the prefect in compliance with ministerial orders. The depart-
mental commission becomes active on submission of the dispute to
it by the prefect, who in his turn acts either on his own initiative
or on the demand of the party. The prefect can, however, in dis-
putes of particular importance, submit the same to the competent
minister, likewise either on his own initiative or on the demand
of a party, and the minister thereupon and after consultation with
the minister of labor can refer the dispute to the national con-
ciliation commission in his department. The parties must appear
in person.
If no accord is reached, the matter goes to arbitration. The
parties are invited to designate either one arbitrator for each or one
common arbitrator. If they fail to do so, either the minister or
the prefect (depending upon which conciliation commission acted)
will appoint two arbitrators. The prefect must choose one from
a list of employers and the other from a list of employees, which
lists are both made up by the chief justice of the Court of Appeal
in the respective region on advice of the prefect and after consulta-
tion with the most representative workers and employers' organ-
izations. The minister picks his arbitrators from two lists of
employers and employees selected by the National Economic
Council. If the arbitrators do not agree, a final arbitrator takes
158Joumal Officiel, April 21st, 1938, (1938) 1 Droit Social 141.
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the case, nominated either by the arbitrators or, if they cannot
agree upon any person, by the competent minister after consulta-
tion with the minister of labor.
b. The statute further defined the powers of the arbitrators
somewhat more strictly by providing:
"The arbitrators and final arbitrators pass, according to the
rules of the common law, on all collective labor disputes of legal
character, i.e. on disputes regarding the performance of collective
agreements and the observation of labor law and decrees. The
arbitrators and final arbitrators pass in equity on all other collec-
tive labor disputes, particularly such of economic nature."'r
c. The most significant innovations of the new statute deal with
the enforceability and the judicial review of the awards. The new
statute prescribes expressly that no appeal shall lie to the Court
of Cassation or the Council of State, 160 and that the awards
should be directly enforceable after rendition, communication to
the parties, and mere filing with the civil tribunal. 10 '
The statute introduces, however, a writ of review (cassation)
from the awards (which must be rendered with reasons like judg-
ments10 2 ) to a newly established Supreme Court of Arbitration.
This writ is no appeal, but a writ of review on the law only, based
on three classical grounds for such writ :103 lack of jurisdiction,
exceeding the power, and violation of law. l11 An interesting
feature is that not only the aggrieved party, but also the minister
of labor, can ask for a review of the award by the Supreme Court
of Arbitration on the same grounds.'0 5 He has, however, also the
additional right of a true appeal. If he thinks that public interest
demands it, he can, on advice of the National Economic Council
and the minister in whose department the dispute falls, ask the
court to render a new decision on the merits.-0 0
The Supreme Court of Arbitration was organized by decree
of April 3rd, 1938.107 It is composed of the vice president of the
Council of State as its president, one division president of the
Council of State, two councillors of state, two judges of the or-
'
59Statute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 9, Par. 2 and 3. One could say that
France thus returned to the famous maxim that equity follows the law.
I0oStatute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 13, Par. 2.
'
11Statute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 15.
162Statute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 13, Par. 1.
63The writ of cassation to the Supreme Court in ordinary civil cases
results likewise in a review on points of law only, and can be based on
similar grounds.
164Statute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 13, Par. 3.
165Statute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 13, Par. 4.
'
0 6Statute, March 4th, 1938, Art. 13, Par. 4.
lOTJournal Officiel, April 5th, 1938, (1938) 1 Droit Social 138.
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dinary courts of justice in high positions, and, two other high
ranking public officials. For the appeals on the merits in the
public interest, two worker representatives and two employer
representatives belonging to the Permanent Commission of the
National Economic Council are added. An equal number of
councillors of state, judges, public officers and worker and em-
ployer representatives are appointed as substitutes.168 The Arbitra-
tion Court shows a strong personal tie up with the Council of
State (which has the function of a supreme administrative court),
and also has its seat in the locality of the latter. The procedure
before the Supreme Arbitration Court resembles likewise in many
respects French administrative procedure.'
The statute of March 4th, 1938, completed substantially the
present French system of collective agreements and arbitration.
Mention might be made of a decree of November 12th, 1934,176
which added some provisions strengthening the legal effect of the
awards and improving upon the procedure, and of article 17 of a
statute of May 2nd' 71 which strengthened the effect of collective
agreements or awards rendered obligatory on outsiders by decree
of the minister, by declaring it a criminal offense to pay inferior
wages.
III. The effect of the new statute.-The significance of
the new statute is extraordinary. It creates for the collective labor
disputes which, in so far as legal issues were involved, until the
statute of 1936 had been within the competence of the not always
collectively spirited 172 ordinary courts of justice, an entire new
branch of judicial administration headed by the Supreme Court of
Arbitration. On the side of the traditional two branches of the
French judiciary, i.e., the ordinary courts and the administrative
courts, stands now a third one which has been called "social juris-
168The individual appointments were made by decrees of Apr. 4th, 6th,
7th, and 27th; cf. (1938) 1 Droit Social 141.
MiThe procedure is regulated by decree of April 3rd, Articles 8 ff.,(1938) 1 Droit Social 138. On the French administrative court procedure in
general see Riesenfeld, French System of Administrative Justice-A Model
for American Law? (1938) 38 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 48 ff., 400 ff., 715.
70Journal Officiel, Nov. 13th, 1938, (1938) 1 Droit Social 364.
17'Journal Officiel, 'May 3rd, 1938, (1938) Dalloz, Rec. P6r., part 4,
225.
1 7One might read for instance the bitter remark of a lower court
judge (Tribunal de Commerce de B~ziers, June 14th, 1937, Bouzat v.
Soicit6 des Docks Mf1ridionaux, (1937) Dalloz, Rec. Hebd. 420, saying,
"Considering that the freedom of work still constitutes, at least legally,
as so many other liberties consecrated by the Constitution and the laws of
the Republic, an imprescribtible right of men. .. ."
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diction" (juridiction sociale) . The new Supreme Arbitration
Court has built up quickly a highly interesting body of modern
industrial relations law, mostly pertaining to the right of collec-
tive bargaining and the circumscription of the arbitral jurisdiction
and powers.
(a) The most difficult question is perhaps the one as to what
constitutes a "collective labor dispute" subject to conciliation and
arbitration. 74 The statute does not offer any definition, but leaves
it entirely to the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion. For
instance, does the discharge of a single worker amount to a col-
lective dispute? Generally speaking it does not. 7 5 Neither does
the simultaneous discharge of several workers constitute a collec-
tive labor dispute, even if the union intervenes. 7 8 However, if the
legality of the dismissal or not rehiring is questioned on the
strength of a stipulation in a collective agreement, the controversy
assumes collective character. 7  The discharge of a single worker
will furthermore be a collective dispute, if it is caused by union
activity of the dismissed man or his conduct as workers delegate.178
17 3 Cf. the opinion of Mr. Laroque, commissioner of the government
at the Supreme Arbitration Court in the case of Chambre Syndicale de
l'Industrie du Pdtrole & Paris, (1938) 1 Droit Sociale 255, 256: "In our
view the final arbitrators are neither administrative judges nor judicialjudges. They form a third branch of jurisdiction, constituted in a still
incomplete way, which we like to characterize as "social jurisdiction," and
which today has a Supreme Court of its own, the Supreme Arbitration
Court, a counterpart to the Court of Cassation and the State Council." See
also the article by Professor Scelle, Limites du R~glement Arbitral (1938)
1 Droit Social 404. It might be added that the Tribunal of Conflicts which
is a special tribunal for the decision of jurisdictional conflicts between the
ordinary courts of justice and administrative agencies (cf. Riesenfeld, The
French System of Administrative Justice-A Model for American Law?
(1938) 18 Boston University Law Review 48, 69) decided on December 12th,
1938 that the arbitrators designated by the government could not be held
liable in damages by the ordinary courts of justice for mistakes committed
in their arbitral functions. (1939) 59 Gazette du Palais 141.
17Cf. the comments by Teitgen, (1938) 1 Droit Social, 9, 106, and
Raoul G. (1938) 1 Droit Social, 293.
175See Supreme Arbitration Court, May 16th, 1938, case of Sieur
Costa, (1938) 1 Droit Social 247, and Note by Raoul G. (1938) 1 Droit
Social, 293.
'
76 Supreme Arbitration Court, June 13th, 1938, case of Maison
Descourtieux, (1938) 1 Droit Social 292; see also Supreme Arbitration
Court, July 12th, 1938, case of Soci& Andr6 Citroen, (1938) 1 Droit
Social 293 (dismissal of several workers for acts of violence.)
177 Supreme Arbitration Court, June 13th, 1938, case of Maison Des-
courtieux, loc, cit supra note 176; Supreme Arbitration Court, July 4th,
1938, case of Socit6 des ttablissements Santos, (1938) 1 Droit Social
292; Supreme Arbitration Court, July 11th, 1938, case of Soci~t6 France-
Transports Domicile, (1938) 1 Droit Social, 352.
'
7 8 Supreme Arbitration Court, June 15th, 1938 case of Compagnie
d'Alectricit6 et de Luminescence A Paris, (1938) 1 Droit Social 308;
Supreme Arbitration Court, May 18th, 1938, case of Chambre Syndicale des
Industries M~tallurgiques du Rhone, (1938) 1 Droit Social 210.
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However, the mere fact that the discharged worker was a dele-
gate will not suffice, particularly not, if the union does not inter-
vene, 7 9 and even the threat of strike as a reprisal for the discharge
does not change the nature of the dispute, 80 even though the strike
itself will give rise to arbitration.' 8 '
(b) If it is established that a collective dispute subject to
arbitration exists, 1 2 the powers of the arbitrators with respect to
its settlement become an important problem. The statute distin-
guishes here, as has been mentioned, between collective disputes of
legal character, to be decided according to the rules of the French
common law, and other collective labor disputes to be settled in
equity. Where is the line of demarcation and what are the limits
of this equity? The Supreme Arbitration Court has developed
the following principles: If there exists a statute, a decree or a
collective agreement the arbitrators must apply it. All they can
do in the enforcement' 8" of collective agreements is to construe
them and to examine their validity.' s" They cannot modify exist-
ing clauses or provisions. 8 5 But so far as issues are concerned
which are not regulated by agreement the arbitrators may add a
new equitable regulation of them.' 6 In this case, however, they
exercise their equitable powers, as they do, when they establish a
regulation of all the working conditions in case the parties can-
not reach a collective agreement. Such award cannot compel the
179Supreme Court of Arbitration, August 26th, 1938, case of Sieur
Rassaut, (1938) 1 Droit Social 353.8ISCf. Note by Raoul G., (1938) 1 Droit Social, 293, citing the case of
Salpa Frangaise, June 1st, 1938, and Soci&6 Faure. June 15th, 1938.
's'Supreme Court of Arbitration, May 16th, 1938, case of Sieur Costa,
(1938) 1 Droit Social, 247.
18 2A strike, even though being unlawful, if begun before arbitration,
does not bar the arbitration procedure. Supreme Arbitration Court, May
16th, 1938, case of Sieur Costa, (1938) 1 Droit Social, 247.
188In contrast to the Court of Cassation, the Supreme Arbitral Court
has not permitted the arbitrators to impose fines in their original award
which would be collectible in case one party fails to perform the obligation
established by the award. Supreme Arbitration Court, Oct. 26th, 1938,
Soci~t6 A Responsibilit6 Limit~e Pasquet, (1938) 1 Droit Social 380. The
emergency decree of November 12th 1938, however, authorizes the arbitrators
to impose a fine of not more than one thousand francs in a supplemental award
if a person or organization does not perform the obligations imposed by the
original award. Section 6, (1938) 1 Droit Social 364.
184Supreme Arbitration Court, May 18th, 1938, Soci6t6 Al6sia-Taxis de
Paris, (1938) 1 Droit Social 257.
'16Supreme Arbitration Court, August 5th, 1938, Syndicat Conf6d6r6 de
la Sellerie, (1938) 1 Droit Social, 345. The Court intimated that a modifi-
cation would be admissible in case of unforeseeable changes of fundamental
character, which view is in accord with general principles of French public
law.
'86Cf. the case Supreme Arbitration Court, August 5th, 1938, Syndicat
Confidr6 de la Sellerie, (1938) 1 Drolt Social, 345.
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parties to stipulate accordingly, but the award itself constitutes the
regulation of the labor relations.
187
If the parties are bound by a collective agreement, in general,
the arbitrators cannot substitute another one, but, if an existing
agreement was not concluded by the "most representative indus-
trial groups for a determinate branch in a determinate region" or
if now an agreement for a larger district is required, the Supreme
Arbitration Court has permitted to a certain extent the equitable
intervention of the arbitrators.," The limits of the equitable
powers are defined by the formula that the purpose of the arbitra-
tion is "the reconciliation of the collective interests and rights of
the workers with the freedom and authority of the employer."'' 9
Thus the arbitrator in particular may order the reinstatement of
workers, and this not only if their dismissal or not rehiring was
a violation of a statute or a clause in a collective agreement,1 0
87Supreme Arbitration Court, May 18th, 1938, Usine des Cycles
Helyett, (1938) 1 Droit Social 251; Mai 16th, 1938, Chambre Syndicale des
Constructeurs etc., de l'Arrondissement du Havre, (1938) 1 Droit Social,
252; July 12th, 1938, Chambre Syndicale de l'Habillement de la Somme,(1938) 1 Droit Social 295; July 4, 1938, Union Locale des Syndicats de
Bellegarde, (1938) 1 Droit Social 296; July 6th, 1938, Ptablissement Pigier,
5 Paris, (1938) 1 Droit Social 297; cf. Note by Teitgen, (1938) 1 Droit
Social 297. Instead of establishing a regulation immediately, the arbitrator
may impose upon the parties the duty to make another attempt to reach an
agreement. Supreme Arbitration Court, July 6th, 1938, -tablissements
Pigier, (1938) 1 Droit Social 297.
It is to be noted that in the regulation of labor relations by arbitral
award frequently the question is of importance, whether the dispute exists
between the most representative groups for a determinate branch of the
industry or commerce in a determinate region; then the arbitrators have
to decide whether these conditions are fulfilled and can review on this
occasion the decisions rendered by the Prefects or the Minister of Labor
with respect to the composition of the commissions for the elaboration of a
collective agreement. Cf. Supreme Arbitration Court, July 4th, 1938, Union
Locale des Syndicats de Bellegarde, loc. cit; December 20th, 1938, Chambre
syndicale des Employees de la region parisienne (1939) 2 Droit Social 30.
This issue can also be the very object of a collective dispute. Cf. Supreme
Arbitration Court, June 22nd, 1938, Union des Syndicats Patronaux de
Boulogne, (1938) 1 Droit Social 303; October 24th, 1938, Syndicat Chr~tien
des Employees et Techniciens d'Algrie (1939) 2 Droit Social 29. As to
the elements to be considered cf. supra note 114.
s88Supreme Arbitration Court, June 22nd, 1938, Union des Syndicats
Patronaux de Boulogne, (1938) 1 Droit Social 303 (demand by two
unions to conclude a collective agreement in the forms of the statute of
June 24th, 1936, even though the employers' association was bound by an
agreement with two other unions); Supreme Arbitration Court, July 4th,
1938, Chambre Syndicale des Enterpreneurs de Moulins, (1938) 1 Droit
Social 296 (demand of a convention for larger territory is reason for arbitra-
tion, but the award cannot abrogate the local convention).
'
89Supreme Arbitration Court, June 29th, 1938, Syndicats des Grandes
Pharmacies, (1938) 1 Droit Social 346; June 15th, 1938, Campagnie
d'tlectricit6 et de Luminescence, (1938) 1 Droit Social, 309.
'
9 OSupreme Arbitration Court, July 4th, 1938, Soci6t6 des Atabl. Santos,(1938) 1 Droit Social, 293; June 15th, 1938, Compagnie d'Alectricit6,
(1938) 1 Droit Social 309.
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but also in other collective disputes.' The arbitrators cannot,
however, as a matter of principle limit the right of the employer
to cut down the number of employees for economic reasons. 192
But the Supreme Arbitration Court permitted arbitral jurisdic-
tion in one case where the union required redistribution of work
instead of discharge.
1 93
(c) By drawing these lines under the writ of cassation the
Supreme Arbitration Court has exercised quite a far reaching
control over the arbitral awards, and as a consequence the dis-
tinction between law and equity has become a matter of degree
only." 4 It is assumed that the court will examine even the exact-
ness of material facts upon which awards are based.'95 Thus the
Supreme Arbitration Court has undoubtedly contributed greatly
on the one hand to build up a whole system of "labor-relations
equity"' 8 and on the other hand to reconcile the system of an
arbitral regulation of labor conditions with the idea of the
supremacy of the law.
CONCLUSION
Looking at the development of French labor law, as described
in the foregoing pages, one can hardly deny that it reveals many
trends and features which are of greatest interest to the student
of industrial relations and their law. Particular attention should be
given to the rapid shift of the underlying principles. Collective
bargaining is the way by which the insignificant bargaining power
of the individual is increased and a better balance of the economic
forces of capital and labor in industrial relations can be reached.
Originally the collective agreements were little more than the means
by which workers, acting collectively, could obtain a settlement
of certain controversial issues and improve certain aspects of their
working conditions. From this the idea was conceived that col-
'
9OSupreme Arbitration Court, May 16th, 1938, Sieur Costa, (1938)
1 Droit Social, 247; May 23rd, 1938, Soci~t6 de Louvres, (1938) 1 Droit
Social 261; June 29th, 1938, Syndicats des Grandes Pharmacies, (1938)
1 Droit Social 346.
19 2Cf. Supreme Arbitration Court, June 29th, 1938, Syndicats des
Grandes Pharmacies (arbitrator cannot forbid in advance the discharge
of employees by an employer who wants thus to adjust his greater produc-
tion costs resulting from an award imposing higher wages.)
l93Supreme Arbitration Court, Oct. 5th, 1938, ]tabl. Robbe, (1930)
1 Droit Social 320.
19 4Note by Teitgen (1938) 1 Droit Social, 297, 302.
'9-Cf. Note (1938) 1 Droit Social 260.
'lO"Professor Cuche in (1939) Dalloz. Rec. Hebd. 2 speaks of a "true
pretorien labor law for the purpose to supplement the civil law" ("vritable
droit prttorien du travail, juris civilis complendi causa.")
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lective bargaining could be used as the means by which an indus-
trial self-government founded on a consensual basis could be
worked out. But the cleavage between capital and labor had grown
too deep.197 The increase and protection of the bargaining power
of labor did not result in a fruitful cooperation through the bar-
gaining process. Left holding the bag was neither labor nor capital,
but the general public. The state had to intervene. Thus the
system of an industrial self-government on a consensual basis
was replaced by what one could call "industrial government by
arbitration," complemented by the extension decrees of the Min-
ister. This, to be sure, is still a far cry from wholesale fixing of
labor conditions by administrative ordinance as practiced in the
Nazi-state, but on the other hand it is a definite step beyond an
industrial system based on collective bargaining as such. Whether
this system of compulsory arbitration is workable, is a question
which cannot be answered conclusively as yet. So far it seems to
have been quite successful. 9 '
This experience in France ought not to be taken too lightly.
In 1920, Professor Hale of the Columbia Law School wrote a
short but pungent article called Law Making by Unofficial Minori-
ties,19 in which he emphasized that the recognition of collective
bargaining as such leaves the factor of mutual coercion in the eco-
nomic system, and does not effectuate a balance of power. Collec-
tive bargaining is an important instrument of industrial peace
only if it is resorted to by responsible groups in a spirit of col-
laboration. If it is abused, the general public will suffer.
It might be that the development inevitably and necessarily
drifts toward regulation by arbitration, or even outright regula-
tion by administrative decree. Mr. Hale seems to assume that.
The French experience might at least be a warning that either
the process of collective bargaining must by law and even more
so by morale be made a workable scheme, or compulsory arbitra-
197Cf. Blondel, Nature et Porte de l'Arbitrage Obligatoire, (1938)
1 Droit Social 98, who stated: "The rupture of the equilibrium was such.
however, that the regulation by contract, i. e. an accord freely discussed and
concluded between employer and workers, seemed to be a thing of the past."
29sCf. The high praise bestowed on the work of the Supreme Arbitra-
tion Court by Professor Savatier, loc. cit. supra. note 149. Also Professor
Pic, an eminent authority on French labor law and ardent critic of the statute
of Dec. 1937, seems no longer to object to the new system. Cf. his most
recent article Le Nouveau Statut du Travail et le Redressement National.
Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Jan. 1939, 24 ff. where the preservation
of the arbitration system is apparently taken for granted.
'
99Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 Columbia L. Rev.(1920), 451.
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tion will necessarily be introduced as a remedy against industrial
anarchy and a protection of the general public. The question is
whether one could stop even there. It might well be that on the
success of collective bargaining is hinged the fate of industrial
democracy and democracy in general.
